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Emerging zoonoses threaten global health, yet the processes by which they emerge are com-
plex and poorly understood. Nipah virus (NiV) is an important threat owing to its broad host
and geographical range, high case fatality, potential for human-to-human transmission and
lack of effective prevention or therapies. Here, we investigate the origin of the ﬁrst identiﬁed
outbreak of NiV encephalitis in Malaysia and Singapore. We analyse data on livestock pro-
duction from the index site (a commercial pig farm in Malaysia) prior to and during the
outbreak, on Malaysian agricultural production, and from surveys of NiV’s wildlife reservoir
(ﬂying foxes). Our analyses suggest that repeated introduction of NiV from wildlife changed
infection dynamics in pigs. Initial viral introduction produced an explosive epizootic that
drove itself to extinction but primed the population for enzootic persistence upon reintroduc-
tion of the virus. The resultant within-farm persistence permitted regional spread and
increased the number of human infections. This study refutes an earlier hypothesis that
anomalous El Nin ˜o Southern Oscillation-related climatic conditions drove emergence and
suggests that priming for persistence drove the emergence of a novel zoonotic pathogen.
Thus, we provide empirical evidence for a causative mechanism previously proposed as a
precursor to widespread infection with H5N1 avian inﬂuenza and other emerging pathogens.
Keywords: Nipah virus; epidemic enhancement; infectious disease dynamics;
emerging pathogens; zoonosis; ﬂying fox
1. INTRODUCTION
Preventing and controlling emerging zoonoses require
identiﬁcation of the processes that drive cross-species
pathogen transmission [1]. Agricultural intensiﬁcation
has been proposed as a major underlying cause of patho-
gen emergence from wildlife and domestic animal
populations into human populations [2,3]; however, the
precise mechanisms by which this occurs have rarely
been demonstrated. Speciﬁc agricultural practices may
increasefrequencyofcross-speciespathogentransmission,
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Pathogen introduction into a partially immune popu-
lation—such as a population where some individuals are
vaccinated or were previously infected—can result in
longerand potentially largerepidemics than introduction
into a naive population [4]. We refer to this phenomenon
as immunity-based,population-level‘priming’forpersist-
ence. The potential of such priming to drive zoonotic
emergencehasbeendemonstratedtheoreticallyinthegen-
eral case [4], as a possible precursor to measles emergence
[5] and as a mechanism that could facilitate widespread
emergence of H5N1 avian inﬂuenza in poultry [6]. Here,
we present evidence that this process is not only theoreti-
cally possible but is likely to have played a key role in the
ﬁrst known outbreak of Nipah virus (NiV) encephalitis,
and therefore for the emergence of a lethal zoonosis.
1.1. Background
NiV is a paramyxovirus that emerged in people in
Malaysia in 1998 [7–9]. Serology, virus isolation and
polymerase chain reaction detection indicate that NiV
is maintained in Pteropus spp. fruit bats (ﬂying foxes),
including P. vampyrus andP. hypomelanus inpeninsular
Malaysia [10–12]. Transmission from ﬂying foxes to pigs
is thought to occur via saliva on fomites (discarded fruit
pulp)orviafaecalorurinecontaminationofpigsties[11].
Pigs act as ampliﬁer hosts, enabling infection of humans
via droplet transmission during respiratory infections
[13]. The risk of direct transmission from bats to
humans in Malaysia is believed to be low [14].
Between September 1998 and April 1999, NiV caused
246 reported cases of febrile encephalitis in humans in
peninsularMalaysiaandSingapore[7,8]andanepidemic
of respiratory and neurological disease in commercially
farmed pigs [9,15]. Initial human cases were seen in
Tambun village and surrounding areas in Perak State,
followed by a large epidemic in the southern states
of Negeri Sembilan and Selangor and several cases in
Singapore (ﬁgure 1a). The majority of these cases
occurred in pig farmers and abattoir workers [17].
During the course of the outbreak investigation, nine
cases of NiV encephalitis were retrospectively diagnosed
in the Tambun area with onset dates between January
1997 and May 1998, ﬁve of which were associated with
the index farm of the 1998–1999 outbreak in Perak
(ﬁgure 1a). Six of the nine cases are considered con-
ﬁrmed cases on the basis of serological tests performed
in 1999 [16]; the remaining three are probable cases.
Several mechanisms have been previously proposed
for the appearance of NiV in pig and human popu-
lations in 1998. One frequently cited explanation is
that ﬂying foxes harbouring NiV were new to the
region where transmission to pigs occurred, driven
there by climatic anomalies. In late 1997, an El Nin ˜o
Southern Oscillation-related drought and burning of
forested land in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Indonesia)
created an atmospheric haze across Sumatra and penin-
sular Malaysia [18]. One of us (K.B.C., see group author
list) hypothesized that this atmospheric haze caused
atypical ﬂying fox immigration from Sumatra across
the Straits of Malacca into peninsular Malaysia and
northward towards Perak [18]. This hypothesized
movement of ﬂying foxes into an area with large pig
farms potentially outside the species’ normal range was
proposed to have precipitated transmission of the virus
from bats to pigs. However, a retrospective diagnosis of
human NiV encephalitis cases on the index farm in
early 1997 indicates that bat-to-pig transmission did
not result from these speciﬁc environmental conditions.
In particular, seven of these cases occurred prior to the
rise in airborne particulate matter that is diagnostic of
the haze event, which peaked in September 1997 [18].
The recognition of cases prior to the haze event refutes
the hypothesis that this event drove initial cross-species
transmission (table 1). Furthermore, at the time of the
major outbreak in pigs and humans, NiV antibodies
were found to be widespread in ﬂying fox colonies
within peninsular Malaysia [12], suggesting that the out-
break was not the result of a (recent) point source
introduction of the virus into the bat population, as
previously suggested [18].
1.2. Study rationale
Sinceitsdiscoveryin1999,NiVhasbeenidentiﬁedasthe
cause of human neurological and respiratory disease in
India and Bangladesh [23,24], and molecular evidence
suggestsawidedistribution ofhenipaviruses inthereser-
voir hosts [25–29]. Despite the continued threat that
NiV and related viruses represent to global health, no
detailed studies have combined data on pig populations,
bat colonies and human cases to examine the mechan-
isms that drove the ﬁrst known and largest outbreak.
This paper describes an interdisciplinary approach that
synthesizes all available data to improve and update
our understanding of the process of NiV emergence in
Malaysia. The study has three main branches, all of
which build on earlier work.
First, Chua et al.[ 18] identiﬁed the presence of fruit
trees on the index farm as a plausible link between ﬂying
foxes and pigs that could have precipitated introduction
of the virus. We place this ﬁnding in a broader context
byexaminingspatialandtemporalpatternsofagricultural
production in peninsular Malaysia prior to and at the time
of the outbreak. We also investigate, in detail, the history
and status of fruit crop production on the index farm.
Second, our preliminary models suggested that
repeated introduction could plausibly lead to persist-
ence of the virus in a generic large pig population [30].
In this study, we use detailed information on manage-
ment practices and production patterns at the index
farm to parametrize models of this population. We
use these models to examine whether repeated introduc-
tion was necessary and sufﬁcient to allow the virus to
persist on the farm. We then compare model predictions
of piglet mortality patterns with data from production
records to assess whether repeated introduction led to
persistence of the virus in this population.
Third, Johara et al.[ 12] identiﬁed Pteropus spp. as
likely reservoirs of NiV infection. Here we examine the
distribution of Pteropus bats in peninsular Malaysia,
present data on NiV serology from all known roosts
and examine the opportunities for transmission of the
virus from bats to pigs by placing these ﬁndings in the
context of large-scale agricultural production patterns.
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study to describe the events that led to NiV emergence
in Malaysia and Singapore and discuss the causal nature
of different contributing factors.
2. RESULTS
2.1. Agricultural production patterns
2.1.1. Large-scale patterns. Both pig and mango
(Mangifera indica) production tripled in peninsular
Malaysia between the early 1970s and the late 1990s
(ﬁgure 1c). The intensiﬁcation of production of pigs
and mangoes was loosely correlated during this time
period. The marked decline in both end-of-year
standing pig population (SPP) and annual mango pro-
duction between 1998 and 1999 indicates that this
correlation may reﬂect widespread dual use of agricul-
tural land to produce both pigs and mangoes, with
the decline in commercial mango harvest reﬂecting the
widespread abandonment and culling of infected pig
farms that occurred in the ﬁrst half of 1999 (following
the discovery of NiV).
2.1.2. Patterns on the index farm. Pigs were ﬁrst
brought to the land that became the index farm in
1970. By 1980, the SPP on the property had reached
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Figure 1. (a) Epidemiological data from the entire outbreak region, (b) the index farm and (c) evidence of agricultural intensiﬁca-
tion. (a) Symptomatic Nipah virus cases in Malaysia and Singapore, January 1997–April 1999; data are from the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports [7,8], records from the Department of Veterinary Ser-
vices and the Ministry of Health, Malaysia [16]. Further information on case numbers can be found in the electronic
supplementary material. (b) Detection of Nipah virus-induced pre-weaning mortality in the three breeding sections on the
index farm. To investigate the timing of Nipah-induced mortality in the three breeding sections, we deﬁne a piglet mortality
index (PMI) that compares the observed mortality for each litter with expected mortality (based on the number of piglets
born and the time from farrow to wean). Here we present average PMI values through time, shown as quantiles of the values
observed during the parametrization period; raw litter-level PMI values are shown in the electronic supplementary material.
The presence of Nipah virus is suggested when pre-weaning mortality of piglets is signiﬁcantly greater than expected, and we
infer the presence of Nipah virus when signiﬁcant excess mortality is observed in multiple litters during the same time period
or coincident with human cases. The binned PMI values show that signiﬁcant mortality peaks occurred in the Breeding Nucleus
and Breeding section 2 during the time period of the ﬁrst cluster of human cases in early 1997; individual litters in Breeding sec-
tion 1 also showed elevated mortality during this time period (electronic supplementary material). Piglet mortality then returned
to baseline levels until approximately July 1997, corresponding to the time of the next observed human cases, around which time
the virus is likely to have been reintroduced from the ﬂying fox reservoir. Model output analysed in the same manner as the piglet
mortality data from the index farm is shown in the electronic supplementary material. (i) Breeding Nucleus; (ii) Breeding section
1; (iii) Breeding section 2. (c) Commercial production of mangoes and domestic pigs in Malaysia, 1961–2005. The drop in both
mango (dashed lines) and pig production (solid line) between 1998 and 1999 is because of the depopulation and closing of pig
farms in areas infected with Nipah virus. Mangoes on these farms were not harvested and many of the orchards have since
been abandoned or converted to other crops. Data are from the Food and Agricultural Organization’s Agricultural Production
database.
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J. R. Soc. Interface (2012)30 000 (approx. the same size as at the time the farm
was culled in 1999). Mangoes, jackfruit (Artocarpus
heteropyllus) and durian (Durio sp.) were grown on
the index farm, while other farms in the Tambun area
grew primarily pomelos (Citrus maxima), which are
not eaten by ﬂying foxes. As Chua et al.[ 18] identiﬁed,
several large mango trees were planted directly adjacent
to pig enclosures. Approximately 400 mango trees were
planted on the farm in 1983, and the trees began produ-
cing fruit in 1987. The location of these trees, in relation
to the areas where pigs were kept, is shown in the elec-
tronic supplementary material, which also includes
additional details of the timeline of pig and fruit
production on the index farm.
2.2. Nipah virus on the index farm
2.2.1. Dynamic models. We analysed pig production
data from the index farm and developed an age-
structured model of NiV dynamics within the farm
population. Our model showsthat multiple transmission
events from bats to pigs are the best explanation for the
observed pattern of human cases and pig mortality. As
piglets aged in the index farm, they were moved from
thebreedingsectionsintothegrowingsection,andﬁnally
intotheﬁnishingsectionforthelastsixweeksbeforethey
weresenttoslaughter.Whentheviruswasinitiallyintro-
duced into the pig population, individuals entering the
growing section were immunologically naive. As the
virus spread throughout the farm, the proportion of
pigsenteringthissectionwithactiveimmunityincreased
to the point where too few susceptibles remained for the
chainoftransmissiontocontinue,andtheviruscouldnot
be maintained within the farm population (ﬁgure 2a,c).
The ﬁrst, rapid epizootic of NiV in the pig population on
the index farm thus would have produced highly loca-
lized human infections (ﬁgure 1a) and the virus most
probably went extinct in the pig population at this
time (ﬁgures 2a,c and 3).
Our models suggest that, when NiV was reintroduced
to the farm, it circulated enzootically until the farm was
depopulatedinMarch1999(ﬁgures2and3).Thisﬁnding
is consistent with the timing of human cases associa-
ted with the index farm and with the high antibody
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Figure 2. Deterministic model results illustrating Nipah virus dynamics in the growing section of the index farm. Individuals are
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J. R. Soc. Interface (2012)prevalence detected in sows and piglets in Breeding sec-
tion 2 upon depopulation of the index farm [31]. The
changeindynamicsbetweeninitialandsubsequentintro-
ductions of the virus on the index farm results from the
presence of acquired immunity in the sow population
and conferred immunity in the young pig population.
The age structure within the growing section, along
with its rapid turnoverand large population size, allowed
the virus to circulate enzootically. On reintroduction of
the virus into the growing section, the population had
a different immunological proﬁle from the time of initial
introduction.Manyyoungpigsmovingfromthebreeding
sections into the growing section now carried maternally
derived passive immunity rather than active immunity
obtained from exposure to the virus (ﬁgure 2b). We esti-
mate that maternal antibodies are lost at approximately
14 weeks of age (electronic supplementary material).
Pigs born with maternal antibodies would therefore
become susceptible to the virus roughly four weeks after
entering the growing section, where they would remain
for another six weeks. These dynamics produce a steady
inﬂow of susceptible individuals, which is sufﬁcient to
maintain the virus over a period of 2 years or more
(ﬁgure 2b,d), a period similar to that observed between
the index case for NiV in Malaysia in 1997 and the
onset of the large-scale outbreak. The population size
and turnover rate of the ﬁnishing section suggest that it
may also have permitted enzootic circulation of the
virus (electronic supplementary material).
Stochastic simulations demonstrate that priming for
persistence on the index farm is the most likely scenario
consistent with pig and human epidemiology for R0
values .2.5 (up to R0 ¼ 30, the highest value exam-
ined), and simulations with an R0 value in this range
best reproduce the very high seroprevalence (.95%
for sows and .90% for piglets) detected in Breeding
section 2 at the time of depopulation [31] (electronic
supplementary material).
2.2.2. Data analysis. Although no direct prevalence
data exist for NiV in the pig population on the index
farm, the presence of the virus in the breeding sections
can be inferred from production records kept by the
farm’s managers (electronic supplementary material)
and from reported serological ﬁndings [31]. These data
are consistent with the scenario predicted by the
model and with the timing of human cases: there was
a period of approximately ﬁve to six months between
the ﬁrst introduction of the virus into the pig popula-
tion and subsequent, smaller peaks in piglet mortality
(ﬁgure 1b), when the virus was probably reintroduced
into the farm—probably from the ﬂying fox reservoir,
or possibly from other pig farms in the area. The
virus appears to have spread into each of the three
breeding sections between December 1996 and Febru-
ary 1997, with strong evidence of infection (unusually
high piglet mortality) in at least two of the breeding
sections (Breeding Nucleus and Breeding section 2)
during January 1997, and signiﬁcant mortality on a
number of subsequent occasions, following an interim
period in which piglet mortality returned to baseline
levels (ﬁgure 1b and electronic supplementary material).
2.3. Bat surveys
2.3.1. Bat distribution. We conducted a countrywide
survey of the distribution and infection status of the
two Pteropus species in peninsular Malaysia. We
located 14 active P. vampyrus roost sites across peninsu-
lar Malaysia, four P. hypomenlanus roosts on islands
surrounding the peninsula and one mixed roost near
Langkawi Island off the northwest coast. We estimated
the current distribution of Pteropus spp. bats in penin-
sular Malaysia using combined results of wildlife
surveys and analysis of hunter licensing data (ﬁgure 4
and electronic supplementary material). The overall
distribution of ﬂying foxes in peninsular Malaysia is
similar to that observed in a large-scale survey of
ﬂying fox populations conducted in 1999 [32], although
there are fewer permanent roost sites. Satellite tele-
metry studies show that the bats are highly mobile,
moving between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand [33].
We found that ﬂying foxes are consistently present
throughout Perak State, including near the index farm,
where we located two seasonal P. vampyrus roosts:
one in Lenggong, Perak, ,50 km from the index farm,
where we observed a maximum population of approxi-
mately 2500 bats, and another near Tambun, Perak,
within2 kmoftheindexfarm,whichhadbeenpreviously
reported in 1999 [32] and where we observed bats in
2003–2005 [33]. The distance between these roosts and
the index farm is within the bats’ nightly foraging
range. Flying fox roosts were not found in the more den-
sely populated pig-farming regions of southern Selangor
and Negeri Sembilan [32,33](ﬁgure 4).
2.3.2. Bat serosurvey. Serological analysis demonstrates
that evidence of NiV infection is ubiquitous throughout
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Figure 3. Results from an individual-based model of Nipah
virus dynamics on the index farm: proportion of epidemics
leading to enzootic circulation of Nipah virus on the index
farm, with and without reintroduction of the virus. Simu-
lations show that most epidemics produced by initial
introduction of the virus drive themselves to extinction by
depleting the susceptible population (blue line); however, a
single reintroduction of the virus is most often sufﬁcient to
produce a subsequent epizootic that leads to persistent circu-
lation. Here, we deﬁne persistence as circulation of the virus
from the time of introduction (or reintroduction) until the
farm was depopulated. Analogous results for a wide range of
values for the unknown transmission parameters are shown
in the electronic supplementary material.
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Malaysia (ﬁgure 4). Overall antibody prevalence in
P. vampyrus and P. hypomelanus is 38.7 (n ¼ 163)
and 17.5 per cent (n ¼ 80), respectively, consistent
with previous reports of NiV antibodies or infection in
ﬂying fox populations from northern India and through-
out southeast Asia [12,27–29]. Seropositive bats were
found at all sampling sites, including the Lenggong
colony near the index farm, which had a seroprevalence
of 46 per cent (n ¼ 28, June 2004).
3. DISCUSSION
3.1. Process of emergence
NiV emergence in Malaysia occurred in two phases, and
our current understanding of the processes leading to its
emergence is outlined in ﬁgure 5. Phase I of emergence,
the occurrence of human cases, required that only two
criteria be met: circulation of the virus in a local bat
population and the existence of a pathway for trans-
mission from Pteropus bats to pigs. In phase I, early
human cases were directly linked to the transmission
of virus from bats to pigs, with all identiﬁed cases occur-
ring in the immediate vicinity of the index farm where
bat-to-pig transmission ignited rapid pig-to-pig trans-
mission and produced a tight cluster of human cases
on the index farm and an adjacent property.
Phase II of emergence, incident human cases outside
the area of transmission from ﬂying foxes, required that
the criteria for phase I be met but also mandated the
existence of a pathway for transmission to humans that
had become unlinked from the wildlife reservoir. In prin-
ciple, several scenarios could have produced such a
pathway, as illustrated in ﬁgure 5; however, the evidence
amassed here indicates that the causal pathway realized
Johor
Pahang
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Melaka
Selangor
Terengganu
Kelantan
Kedah
Perak
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KL
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*
*
area index > 1
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Seropositive bats
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Figure 4. Nipah virus serology and ﬂying fox distribution in peninsular Malaysia. The ﬂying fox density in each state is expected
to correlate with two indices that describe the hunting level within the state relative to a null expectation, as described in the
electronic supplementary material. Hunting indices . 1 indicate a higher than expected hunting level and are expected to
correlate with relatively high ﬂying fox densities. Known ﬂying fox roost locations tend to be located in states with relatively
high hunting indices. Nipah virus serology results are given for all sampling sites throughout peninsular Malaysia; seroreactive
bats (white) were found at all sampling sites. PP, Pulau Penang; KL, Kuala Lumpur.
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ence and reintroduction on the index farm, which
created a source of infection independent from the
virus’s circulation in ﬂying foxes.
3.1.1. Phase I emergence. The maturation of mango
trees adjacent to pigsties on the index farm in 1987
created an opportunity for phase I emergence to
occur, with transmission of the virus from ﬂying foxes
to pigs most likely to occur during fruiting or ﬂowering.
The electronic supplementary material includes a time-
line of phase I emergence, which highlights the key
events leading up to the introduction of NiV into the
index farm. We propose that NiV did not emerge for
+
+
+
+
viral circulation
in  FF population
pathway for
transmission
from FFs to pigs
introduction into
pig population
persistence in pig
population
reintroduction
into pig
population
agricultural
intensiﬁcation
human-to-human
transmission
incident human
cases outside
area of spillover
from FFs
occurrence of
human cases
Negeri  Sembilan Perak
transportation of
pigs (for sale or
slaughter)
Figure 5. Complex causality of Nipah virus emergence in Malaysia. Each rectangle represents a component cause of emergence.
Grey rectangles represent ‘realized’ component causes that were present in Malaysia, whereas white rectangles represent ‘poten-
tial’ component causes that did not occur. Boxes surrounding multiple component causes indicate complete or near-complete
synergy between these causes. Arrows indicate that some component causes can bring about other component causes (creating
a causal pathway), or can lead directly to an outcome of interest (phase I or phase II emergence, highlighted in red). We refer to
component causes that brought about another component cause that had been a missing link in the causal pathway as ‘drivers’
(highlighted in dark blue). Alternative pathways that would have been sufﬁcient to produce both phases of emergence—had they
occurred—are indicated by dashed arrows. Speciﬁcally, introduction of Nipah virus into an area with extremely dense pig-
farming activity (such as Port Dickson in Negeri Sembilan or Sabang Perai Utara in Pulau Penang) probably could have resulted
in viral persistence without priming and reintroduction. However, these areas lacked factors further up the causal pathway: the
absence of Pteropus bats in these areas prevented viral introduction prior to the establishment of an alternative source of infec-
tion (e.g. persistent viral circulation on the index farm in Kinta, Perak). Similarly, if Nipah virus in Malaysia had resulted in
human-to-human transmission, an alternative causal pathway could have produced incident human cases outside the area of
transmission from ﬂying foxes, as was seen in the Faridpur outbreak in Bangladesh in 2004 [34], but there is no evidence that
such human-to-human transmission occurred in Malaysia [35]. The causal pathway that was realized in Malaysia most probably
involved (i) the creation of a pathway for transmission from bats to pigs via agricultural intensiﬁcation (i.e. dual-use agriculture,
or the practice of planting fruit trees on land used for livestock production, and increased fruit production through time) and (ii)
repeated introduction of the virus into a high-turnover commercial pig population in Perak that led to viral persistence and set
the stage for phase II of the emergence process. FF, ﬂying fox.
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owing to chance events within the system, e.g. fruit
bat population dynamics, migratory behaviour or the
dynamics of NiV in bat populations. This is supported
by our own work on Hendra virus which suggests
that, when the virus is actively transmitted within a
bat colony, there is a heightened chance of repeated
spillover, but circulation of the virus in bats is unlikely
at any given place and time [36]. On the other hand,
we cannot rule out the possibility that speciﬁc local con-
ditions in late 1996 and early to mid-1997 caused
increased viral shedding among bats in the area sur-
rounding the index farm, thereby increasing the risk
of cross-species transmission to pigs.
Given the high mobility of ﬂying foxes and the
seasonal ﬂuctuation in colony sizes in peninsular
Malaysia [33], NiV is probably transmitted regularly
between roost sites and throughout the region. Such
dynamics explain the ubiquity of NiV antibodies, and
our data suggest that ﬂying foxes and possibly NiV
were regularly present near the index farm in Perak
prior to the 1998–1999 outbreak. Thus, we propose
that it is plausible that ﬂying foxes repeatedly
introduced the virus onto the index farm in 1997.
3.1.2. Phase II emergence. Our analyses have shown
that the initial introduction on the index farm was
most probably insufﬁcient to induce persistent circula-
tion of the virus. Furthermore, the lack of human
cases on other farms between the time that this epizoo-
tic would have burned out and the reappearance of
human cases associated with the index farm strongly
suggests that the virus was not circulating on farms in
the surrounding area in the interim. The short duration
of this initial epizootic appears to have provided an
insufﬁcient window of time for transportation of pigs
between farms to spread the infection. On the other
hand, reintroduction of the virus into the ‘primed’ pig
population on the index farm provided a substantially
longer window of opportunity for spread. Our model’s
results indicate that reintroduction of the virus at the
time of the reappearance of human cases on the index
farm would have permitted enzootic circulation of the
virus until the farm was culled in 1999.
During this time, the infection spread to other farms
in the Tambun area, probably via movement of infected
pigs from the index farm, which supplied gilts and pig-
lets to smaller operations in the vicinity. Subsequent pig
movement (including ‘ﬁre sales’ of pigs in reaction to
the cluster of human cases in September–November
1998) allowed the virus to spread throughout Perak
and eventually south to Negeri Sembilan and Selangor
[15]. Because there was no evidence of transmission
between humans [35], the pattern of human infection
necessarily followed the spread of the virus in pigs,
explaining why human cases were much more wide-
spread in 1998–1999 than in 1997. In addition, the
high density of pig farms in many parts of the south
(electronic supplementary material) may have allowed
respiratory transmission of the virus between adjacent
farms without physical movement of infected pigs, con-
tributing to the rapid spread of infection and high
number of human cases in the south. On the other
hand, these areas were buffered from phase I emergence
via bat-to-pig transmission by the absence of ﬂying
foxes in the area [33]( ﬁgure 4) and, possibly, a lesser
degree of overlap between fruit and pig production
(electronic supplementary material).
3.2. Drivers of emergence
Wehaveidentiﬁedtwosynergisticcomponentcauses[37]
thatprecipitatedeachphaseofemergence(ﬁgure5).The
existence of a pathway for transmission from ﬂying foxes
topigswasanecessarycomplementtoviralcirculationin
the bat population to produce phase I of emergence, and
viral persistence in the pig population on the index
farm created an infection source outside the ﬂying fox
reservoir that, combined with transportation of pigs,
was sufﬁcient to produce phase II of emergence. Each
of these component causes was brought about by a
phenomenon that—while not strictly necessary—did
ultimately permit emergence in this context. We refer
tothesefactorsas‘drivers’ofemergence,andtable1out-
linesthe evidence forinterpreting each ofthese driversas
a causal factor. Agricultural intensiﬁcation (namely,
dualuseofagriculturallandandincreasesinproduction)
resulted in the direct overlap of mango production and
livestock rearing and therefore produced a pathway for
a virus circulating in ﬂying foxes to infect an intensively
managed commercial pig population, driving phase I of
emergence. Because NiV had a very low probability of
persisting on the index farm without reintroduction
(ﬁgure 3), priming for persistence was necessary to
bring about enzootic circulation in this context and
appears to have been sufﬁcient to do so, driving phase II
of emergence.
3.3. Broader implications
This study illustrates how a broad, interdisciplinary
approach to the study of emerging zoonoses focused
on data from speciﬁc emergence events can illuminate
emergence processes. We have demonstrated the speciﬁc
role of agricultural expansion, particularly dual use of
agricultural land and intensiﬁed pig production practices,
in NiVemergence. A role for long-term changes in species
interactions has previously been hypothesized for numer-
ous host-jumping viral species including various primate
retroviruses [38,39], SARS [40] and avian inﬂuenza
viruses, and our evidence suggests that cross-species
transmission of NiV most probably resulted from the
expanded interface between wild animal reservoirs and
human or domestic animal populations, although it is
possible that short-term ecological conditions were also
a contributing factor.
Ourﬁndingshaveimportantimplicationsforcontrolof
NiV in commercial pig farms, prevention of widespread
epidemics in livestock and our general understanding of
zoonotic disease emergence. First, although restrictions
on planting fruit trees near pigsties appear to have pre-
vented introduction of the virus into pig populations in
Malaysiasince1999,thereisapossibilityofreintroduction
both there and in other countries where ﬂying foxes are
found. Regular surveillance of pigs sent to markets and
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distributions, along with hospital-based surveillance of
encephalitis cases, may permit identiﬁcation of initial
NiV introductions and allow for early intervention and
prevention of subsequent spread. Second, widespread
prophylactic vaccination of pig populations is likely to
be cost-prohibitive because of the rapid turnover of com-
mercial pig populations. In addition, if vaccine coverage
were not kept at a sufﬁcient level, the dynamics of the
viruswhenintroducedintothepopulationwouldresemble
thosefollowingreintroductionontheindexfarm,inducing
long-term persistence and increasing the risk of phase II
emergence (electronic supplementary material).
Finally, an important feature of the NiV outbreak in
Malaysia and Singapore was the two-phase process by
which emergence occurred, which implies that there was
a missed opportunity for earlier recognition of this novel
aetiological agent and potential intervention. Zoonotic
pathogens often go unnoticed during the initial stages
of ‘viral chatter’—that is, repeated introductions that
cause only a small number of cases [41]—because they
arenotyeteasilytransmissibleinhumans(e.g.simianret-
roviruses), are initially asymptomatic (e.g. HIV), are
clinically similar to other diseases (e.g. NiV in Malaysia,
whichwasoriginallymisdiagnosedasJapaneseencephali-
tis despite its epidemiological distinctiveness) and/or
occur in areas with poor surveillance and diagnostic test-
ing (e.g. NiV in Bangladesh and India). Other pathogens
arenoticedrelativelyquicklybecausetheycausedramatic
disease (e.g. Ebola haemorrhagic fever); however, even in
these situations, we cannot rule out the possibility of pre-
viousundocumentedcases, andthediscoveryofhistorical
cases after the identiﬁcation of an emerging pathogen is
common (NiV [16], SARS [42], HIV [38] and H5N1 inﬂu-
enza [43]).
These patterns support previous calls for increasing
targeted global surveillance and pathogen discovery in
atypical disease outbreaks [44,45]. As the Malaysian NiV
outbreakhighlights,surveillanceoflivestockandlivestock
workers in regions of high wildlife biodiversity would
improve the chances that viral chatter of wildlife origin
is detected prior to a widespread epidemic in livestock or
people. This approach may be critical for identifying
new outbreaks of NiV, which has recently demonstrated a
potentialtoproducepropagatedoutbreaksinBangladesh,
where short chains of human-to-human transmission
have occurred [34]. It may also provide a strategy for the
identiﬁcation of unknown henipaviruses, and other novel
agents, prior to epidemic or pandemic emergence.
4. MATERIAL AND METHODS
4.1. Agricultural production patterns
4.1.1. Large-scale patterns. Malaysian mango pro-
duction data (in metric tonnes per year) and domestic
pig census data (in head of pig, censused at the end of
the calendar year) for 1961–2005 were obtained from
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the
UnitedNations’freeonlineAgriculturalProductiondata-
base(FAOSTATClassic;http://faostat.fao.org;accessed
15November2006).District-leveldensitydataformango
and pig production in 1997 were provided by the
Malaysian government. Further details on these data
are available in the electronic supplementary material.
4.1.2. Patterns on the index farm. In order to better
understand the history, layout and daily operation of
the index farm, J.R.C.P. conducted ﬁeld interviews of
farm workers, including two private veterinarians who
oversaw the health of the animals, and the orchard man-
ager, as well as government veterinarians who oversaw
and participated in the depopulation campaign.
4.2. Nipah virus on the index farm
4.2.1. Dynamic models. Population dynamic models of
production dynamics on the index farm were developed
and parametrized fromdescriptionsoffarm-management
practices provided during interviews with farm workers
and detailed production records from 1 January 1995 to
31 October 1996. Models of infection dynamics were
thenconstructedbybuildingonthesebaselinepopulation
models. Dynamics were explored using a deterministic
ordinary differential equation (ODE) model with a cut-
off value of one infected individual (calculated as the
sum of individuals in all exposed and infectious classes),
below which the infection was considered to have gone
extinct. A stochastic individual-based model (IBM) was
then used to conﬁrm that the qualitative dynamics
observed in the ODE model were robust to the incorpor-
ation of empirically derived waiting time distributions
and other factors that could not be represented in the
ODE framework. The stochastic model was run for a
wide range of parameter combinations to assessthe prob-
ability of extinction following initial and subsequent
introductions under different scenarios and to assess the
range of transmission parameters consistent with
observed seroprevalence levels in Breeding section
2. Detailed descriptions of the ODE model and the IBM
are given in the electronic supplementary material.
4.2.2. Data analysis. Statistical analyses of produc-
tion records were developed to detect evidence of the
virus in the breeding sections. A baseline model for
pre-weaning piglet mortality was formulated for each
breeding section on the basis of production records
from 1 January 1995 through 31 October 1996, and can-
didate models were compared by Akaike information
criterion. For all litters born after this period, a piglet
mortality index (PMI) was calculated that indicates
the extent to which the observed mortality deviates
from the expected mortality for a litter of the same
size during the baseline period. Litter-level data are
shown in the electronic supplementary material.
For the sake of interpreting large-scale patterns over
time, litters were binned according to farrowing date.
We established a baseline for variation across bins in
the average PMI based on the period from 1 January
1995 to 31 October 1996. In ﬁgure 1b, the binned
PMI values are scaled in terms of the binned PMI per-
centile (relative to variation within the parametrization
period). Absolute values and further details of the
analysis are shown in the electronic supplementary
material.
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4.3.1. Bat census techniques. We collaborated with the
federal wildlife department and enlisted a network of
sport hunters as informants to locate and monitor
ﬂying fox roost locations throughout peninsular
Malaysia. A full description of census techniques (and
additional ﬁndings) has been published elsewhere [33].
We also developed two indices of ﬂying fox density
based on different expectations for how hunting prac-
tices reﬂect bat distribution. These indices and their
underlying assumptions are described in the electronic
supplementary material.
4.3.2. Bat serosurvey. Flying foxes were non-randomly
sampled using mist nets and anaesthetized. Three milli-
litres of blood was collected from the brachial vein and
stored for 24h at 48C to allow for serum separation. The
separated serum was then stored at 2208C until use. All
bats were released at the site of capture after recovery
from anaesthesia. Serum neutralization tests were con-
ducted on all serum samples at the Australian Animal
Health Laboratory, Geelong, Australia, under Biosafety
Level4conditions.Detailsonanaesthesiaandtestingpro-
tocols are given in the electronic supplementary material.
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wrote the paper with assistance from J.H.E.; J.R.C.P.
designed and conducted the modelling and statistical
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related to livestock; J.H.E. and S.A.R. led the bat survey
work, and S.A.R. conducted some of the sample testing.
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